Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Trump v. United States Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 25, 2024. Petitioner: Donald J. Trump.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: D. John Sauer (for the Petitioner) Michael R. Dreeben (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Former President Donald Trump was indicted in August 2023 on four counts arising from Special Counsel Jack Smith’s investigation into the January 6, 2021, attacks on the U.S. Capitol. Trump claimed that he cannot be prosecuted for his official acts as president and that a former president cannot be prosecuted unless he has first been impeached by the House and convicted by the Senate. U.S. District Judge Tanya Chutkan initially set Trump’s trial for March 4, 2024, but later vacated this date pending resolution of Trump’s immunity claims. Judge Chutkan denied Trump’s motion to dismiss on immunity grounds, and Smith asked the Supreme Court directly to expedite review and bypass a decision by the D.C. Circuit. The Court declined, deferring instead to the D.C. Circuit’s judgment. On February 6, the D.C. Circuit upheld Chutkan’s decision, and Trump requested a stay of the D.C. Circuit’s ruling. Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided to expedite the case. Question Does a former president enjoy presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for conduct alleged to involve official acts during his tenure in office, and if so, to what extent?

Moyle v. United States Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 24, 2024. Petitioner: Mike Moyle, et al.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Joshua N. Turner (for the Petitioners) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In August 2022, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, which eliminated the constitutional right to an abortion, the Biden administration brought a legal challenge to a restrictive Idaho abortion law. The Biden administration argued that the state law, which criminalizes providing an abortion except in a few narrow circumstances, including to save the life of the mother, is preempted by a federal law, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA). EMTALA requires hospitals receiving Medicare funding to offer “necessary stabilizing treatment” to pregnant women in emergencies. The district court ruled in favor of the Biden administration and barred Idaho from enforcing its law to the extent that it conflicted with EMTALA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, declined to stay the district court's ruling while the state appealed. Question Does the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act preempt an Idaho law that criminalizes most abortions in that state?

Starbucks Corporation v. McKinney Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 23, 2024. Petitioner: Starbucks Corporation.Respondent: M. Kathleen McKinney. Advocates: Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioner) Austin L. Raynor (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In early January 2022, Nikki Taylor, a supervisor at a Memphis Starbucks, initiated union-organizing efforts, contacting Buffalo, New York, Starbucks employees and the Union for guidance. Conversations with colleagues about unionizing led to managerial scrutiny and disciplinary actions against Taylor for alleged insubordination and a dress code violation. Despite this, Taylor and coworkers held a meeting with Union representatives and drafted a letter to Starbucks's CEO announcing their intent to unionize. On January 18, following the public release of the unionization letter, the Memphis store was closed early by management under the pretext of understaffing, coinciding with a media event covering the unionization efforts. Subsequent investigations by Starbucks led to the February 8 firing of seven employees, including key organizing committee members, for policy violations during the media event. These terminations led to a reduced display of union support among the remaining staff and increased anxiety about unionizing in other Starbucks locations. However, the Memphis store voted to join the Union in June. The Union filed charges against Starbucks for unfair labor practices. Following an investigation, a district court ordered a temporary injunction, demanding the reinstatement of the terminated employees. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the NLRB satisfied its burden of showing “‘reasonable cause’ to believe that employers engaged in unfair labor practices and that an injunction protects the Board’s remedial power.” Question What test must courts use to evaluate requests for injunctions under Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act?

Department of State v. Munoz Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 23, 2024. Petitioner: Department of State, et al.Respondent: Sandra Munoz, et al. Advocates: Curtis E. Gannon (for the Petitioners) Eric T. Lee (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Sandra Muñoz, a U.S. citizen, married Luis Asencio-Cordero, an El Salvadoran citizen, in 2010. They have a U.S. citizen child. Asencio-Cordero, who arrived in the U.S. in 2005 and has multiple tattoos, applied for an immigrant visa after Muñoz filed an approved immigrant-relative petition and waiver for his inadmissibility. In 2015, he returned to El Salvador for his visa interview, denying any gang affiliations. However, in December 2015, the U.S. Consulate denied his visa under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii), suggesting his potential involvement in unlawful activities. Muñoz sought intervention from Congresswoman Judy Chu, but the State Department upheld the decision. A declaration from a gang expert, Humberto Guizar, stated that Asencio-Cordero’s tattoos were not gang-related. Despite this and further appeals, including to the State Department's Office of Inspector General, the decision remained unchanged, with authorities confirming the inadmissibility and indicating no grounds for appeal. Following the government’s denial of Asencio-Cordero’s immigrant visa application, the plaintiffs sought judicial review, arguing that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, invoking the doctrine of consular nonreviewability to prevent judicial scrutiny of the visa decision. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the government failed to provide the constitutionally required notice within a reasonable time after the visa application was denied. As a result, the appellate court determined that the government was not entitled to summary judgment based on the doctrine of consular nonreviewability and vacated the district court's decision. Question Does the denial of a visa to the non-citizen spouse of a U.S. citizen infringe on a constitutionally protected interest of the citizen and, if so, did the government properly justify that decision in this case?

Smith v. Spizzirri Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 22, 2024. Petitioner: Wendy Smith, et al.Respondent: Keith Spizzirri, et al. Advocates: Daniel L. Geyser (for the Petitioners) E. Joshua Rosenkranz (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Plaintiffs Smith and others were current and former delivery drivers for Intelliserve. They sued Intelliserve in Arizona state court alleging that “Intelliserve violated federal and state employment laws by misclassifying them as independent contractors, failing to pay them required minimum and overtime wages, and failing to provide paid sick leave.” Intelliserve removed the case to federal court, then moved to compel arbitration and to dismiss the case. While both parties agreed that, under the FAA, all claims were subject to mandatory arbitration, they disagreed on how the district court was supposed to handle the lawsuit. Intelliserve argued that Section 3 of the FAA permitted the district court to dismiss the action, while the plaintiffs argued that the FAA required the district court to stay the action pending arbitration. The district court dismissed the action without prejudice, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Question Does Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act give district courts discretion to dismiss a lawsuit when all claims are subject to arbitration?

City of Grants Pass v. Johnson Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 22, 2024. Petitioner: City of Grants Pass, Oregon.Respondent: Gloria Johnson, et al. Advocates: Theane D. Evangelis (for the Petitioner) Edwin S. Kneedler (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Kelsi B. Corkran (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The city of Grants Pass in southern Oregon has a population of approximately 38,000, and of that population, somewhere between 50 and 600 persons are unhoused. Whatever the exact number of unhoused persons, however, it exceeds the number of available shelter beds, requiring that at least some of them sleep on the streets or in parks. However, several provisions of the Grants Pass Municipal Code prohibit them from doing so, including an “anti-sleeping” ordinance, two “anti-camping” ordinances, a “park exclusion” ordinance, and a “park exclusion appeals” ordinance. In September 2018, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided Martin v. City of Boise, holding that “the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of criminal penalties for sitting, sleeping, or lying outside on public property for homeless individuals who cannot obtain shelter.” While the Grants Pass Municipal Code provisions impose only civil penalties, they still can mature into criminal penalties. A district court certified a class of plaintiffs of involuntarily unhoused persons living in Grants Pass and concluded that, based on the unavailability of shelter beds, the City’s enforcement of its anti-camping and anti-sleeping ordinances violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, and the Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc. Question Does a city’s enforcement of public camping against involuntarily homeless people violate the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment?

Thornell v. Jones Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 17, 2024. Petitioner: Ryan Thornell, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections.Respondent: Danny Lee Jones. Advocates: Jason D. Lewis (for the Petitioner) Jean-Claude Andre (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In Bullhead City, Arizona, on March 26, 1992, Danny Lee Jones and Robert Weaver engaged in a day of drinking and using crystal methamphetamine. A violent altercation ensued, resulting in Jones fatally striking Weaver with a baseball bat. Jones also attacked Weaver’s grandmother, Katherine Gumina, and his seven-year-old daughter, Tisha, the latter of whom he also strangled or suffocated. Jones fled to Las Vegas but was arrested and indicted in Arizona on two counts of first-degree murder and one count of attempted murder. His public defender, inexperienced in capital cases, received limited funding for expert witnesses. Jones was convicted on all counts, and a sentencing hearing was scheduled. At sentencing, testimony revealed Jones’s troubled childhood, including substance abuse, head injuries, and abuse by his first stepfather. Dr. Jack Potts, a forensic psychiatrist, assessed Jones, citing a history of substance abuse, possible mood disorders, and susceptibility to aggression due to drug use. Potts’s report, submitted late due to delayed receipt of the Presentence Information Report, suggested Jones’s impaired capacity to conform to the law at the time of the offenses. Despite a request for a continuance for further psychological testing, the judge found multiple aggravating factors for the murders and sentenced Jones to death for both murders and an additional twenty-five years for the attempted murder. The Arizona Supreme Court upheld the conviction and sentence, and Jones filed a federal petition for habeas relief. After protracted litigation and appeals, the district court dismissed Jones’s habeas petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that application of the appropriate standards pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") meant that Jones was denied the effective assistance of counsel at sentencing. Question What is the proper methodology for assessing prejudice, for purposes of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim?

Fischer v. United States Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 16, 2024. Petitioner: Joseph W. Fischer.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Jeffrey T. Green (for the Petitioner) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) On January 6, 2021, while Congress was convening to certify the results of the 2020 presidential election in favor of Joe Biden, thousands of supporters of the losing candidate, Donald Trump, converged on the United States Capitol to disrupt the proceedings. The Trump supporters swarmed the building, overwhelming law enforcement officers who attempted to stop them. The chaos wrought by the mob forced members of Congress to stop the certification and flee for safety. Congress was not able to resume its work for six hours. Joseph Fischer, Edward Lang, and Garret Miller were indicted for various offenses related to their involvement in the Capitol riot on January 6. All three were charged with felony offenses of assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain officers, and misdemeanor offenses of disorderly conduct in a Capitol building and in restricted grounds, involving the intent to disrupt congressional sessions and government functions. Additionally, each faced a count of obstruction of an official proceeding. The defendants challenged this obstruction charge, claiming that the statute does not prohibit their alleged conduct on that day. The district court agreed, holding that the statute does not apply to assaultive conduct, committed in furtherance of an attempt to stop Congress from performing a constitutionally required duty. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed, concluding that the natural, broad reading of that provision is that it applies to forms of obstructive conduct, not just those related to investigations and evidence. Question Does 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c), which prohibits obstruction of congressional inquiries and investigations, include acts unrelated to investigations and evidence?

Snyder v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 15, 2024. Petitioner: James E. Snyder.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioner) Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) James Snyder formerly served as mayor of Portage, Indiana. He was convicted of federal funds bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) for soliciting and accepting $13,000 in connection with the city’s purchases of garbage trucks, among other federal crimes. Before, during, and after trial, Snyder argued that the evidence did not support a finding that there was an agreement to exchange money for the truck contracts before they were awarded. Without a prior quid pro quo agreement, he argued, § 666 cannot apply. Interpreting the plain language of the statute and Sixth Circuit precedent, the district court rejected his interpretation of that provision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Question Does 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) criminalize gratuities, i.e., payments in recognition of actions a state or local official has already taken or committed to take, without any quid pro quo agreement to take those actions?

Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, Ohio Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 15, 2024. Petitioner: Jascha Chiaverini, et al.Respondent: City of Napoleon, Ohio, et al. Advocates: Easha Anand (for the Petitioners) Vivek Suri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur) Megan M. Wold (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Jascha Chiaverini, manager of the Diamond and Gold Outlet in Napoleon, Ohio, bought a men's ring and diamond earring from Brent Burns for $45. He recorded the transaction, including copying Burns' ID and photographing the items. Subsequently, David and Christina Hill contacted Chiaverini, claiming the jewelry was stolen from them. Chiaverini advised them to report to the police but denied buying their described items. After multiple calls, Chiaverini ended the conversation. Both parties contacted the police. Chiaverini expressed his suspicion about holding stolen property and requested police, not the Hills, to visit. When the police arrived, Chiaverini cooperated, providing information and photographs of the jewelry. The situation escalated when Chiaverini received a conflicting "hold letter" from the police, instructing him to keep the items as evidence but also to release them to the Hills. Chiaverini refused to release the items, citing legal concerns and advice from his counsel. His confrontation with Police Chief Weitzel revealed Chiaverini's lack of a precious-metal-dealer license, prompting a new investigation angle. Officer Steward updated the police report to include Chiaverini's suspicion about the stolen nature of the items, which Chiaverini disputed. Based on these developments, warrants were issued for Chiaverini's arrest and the search of his store, leading to his temporary detention. Although a court later dismissed the criminal case against Chiaverini, he filed a complaint against the officers and the city, alleging various legal violations. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers, citing probable cause for Chiaverini's arrest and dismissing his claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.   Question May a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim proceed as to a baseless criminal charge so long as other charges brought alongside the baseless charge are supported by probable cause?

Erlinger v. United States Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 27, 2024. Petitioner: Paul Erlinger.Respondent: United States. Advocates: Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the Petitioner) Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent, supporting the Petitioner) D. Nick Harper (Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Paul Erlinger received a 15-year prison term under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), for illegally possessing a firearm. This sentence was based on his three prior convictions for violent felonies, all being Indiana burglaries. Erlinger challenged his sentence on two grounds. First, he argued that Indiana’s definition of burglary extends beyond the federal statute, making it non-applicable as a predicate offense under ACCA. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted that Indiana's definition of burglary is “[a] person who breaks and enters the building or structure of another person, with intent to commit a felony in it.” Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1 (1990) is no broader than the federal definition of general burglary, which is “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Secondly, Erlinger argued that these burglaries did not occur on separate occasions, and claimed that the determination of this fact should be made by a jury, not a judge, as per the Sixth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s decision in Wooden v. United States (2022). The Seventh Circuit disagreed, finding that under binding circuit precedent, the government was not required to prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that Erlinger committed the Indiana burglaries on separate occasions, only to the sentencing judge by a preponderance of the evidence. Question Does the Constitution require a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt to find that a defendant’s prior convictions were “committed on occasions different from one another,” as is necessary to impose an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act?

Connelly v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 27, 2024. Petitioner: Thomas A. Connelly, as Executor of the Estate of Michael P. Connelly, Sr.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioner) Yaira Dubin (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Brothers Michael and Thomas Connelly were the sole shareholders of a corporation. The corporation obtained life insurance on each brother so that if one died, the corporation could use the proceeds to redeem his shares. When Michael died, the Internal Revenue Service assessed taxes on his estate, which included his stock interest in the corporation. According to the IRS, the corporation’s fair market value included the life insurance proceeds intended for the stock redemption. Michael’s estate argued otherwise and sued for a tax refund. The district court granted summary judgment to the IRS, finding that the stock-purchase agreement did not affect the valuation and furthermore, that a proper valuation of the corporation must include the life insurance proceeds used for redemption because they were a significant asset of the company. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Question Should the proceeds of a life insurance policy taken out by a closely held corporation on a shareholder in order to facilitate the redemption of the shareholder’s stock be considered a corporate asset when calculating the value of the shareholder’s shares for purposes of the federal estate tax?

Food and Drug Administration v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 26, 2024. Petitioner: Food and Drug Administration, et al.Respondent: Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, et al. Advocates: Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the federal Petitioners) Jessica L. Ellsworth (for Petitioner Danco Laboratories, L.L.C) Erin M. Hawley (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Medication abortion in the U.S. is commonly conducted using a combination of mifepristone and misoprostol. Mifepristone was approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in September 2000 and is used in over half of all U.S. abortions. Initially, its distribution was limited to hospitals and medical facilities under FDA regulations. The 2007 Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act introduced Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS), reinforcing FDA's control over drug approvals. Despite REMS review in 2011, mifepristone's distribution remained restricted. In March 2016, the FDA expanded access, allowing medical practitioners to prescribe it and extending the usage period in pregnancy. In April 2021, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the FDA permitted mail distribution from certified sources, and in January 2023, approved pharmacies also began distributing it. However, following the Supreme Court's June 2022 decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, which eliminated the constitutional right to abortion, several states sought to restrict mifepristone’s sale. The Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine and other anti-abortion groups challenged the FDA’s approval, claiming inadequate consideration of evidence in 2000. In April 2023, a federal district court judge sided with the plaintiffs, suspending the FDA’s approval. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit partially stayed this decision, maintaining the original 2000 approval but striking down the 2016 REMS changes that eased access. After a hearing on the merits, in August 2023, the Fifth Circuit upheld the ban on changes made in 2016. The U.S. Supreme Court granted review and stayed the lower court’s injunction. Question 1. Do respondents have Article III standing to challenge the Food and Drug Administration’s 2016 and 2021 actions with respect to mifepristone’s approved conditions of use? 2. Were the FDA’s 2016 and 2021 approvals of mifepristone arbitrary and capricious? 3. Did the district court properly grant preliminary relief?

Becerra v. San Carlos Apache Tribe Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 25, 2024. Petitioner: Xavier Becerra, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.Respondent: San Carlos Apache Tribe. Advocates: Caroline A. Flynn (for the Petitioners) Adam G. Unikowsky (for the Respondent in 23-253) Lloyd B. Miller (for the Respondent in 23-250) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Indian Health Service (IHS) manages healthcare for Native tribes, billing Medicare, Medicaid, or private insurance for services and retaining the revenue. To enhance tribal sovereignty, Congress passed the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA), allowing tribes to administer their healthcare programs. These programs were funded by the IHS, equivalent to what IHS would spend on tribal healthcare. However, tribes faced financial challenges in running these programs due to the lack of bureaucratic and legal support available to the federal government. To address this, Congress mandated IHS to provide tribes with contract support costs (CSC), ensuring they could offer services at par with IHS. Despite this assistance, tribes still struggled with parity issues with IHS, primarily due to slow billing processes and imperfect remittance of funds by IHS. To remedy this, Congress permitted tribes to bill outside insurers directly and retain the third-party revenue, which the Tribe was required to spend on healthcare. The San Carlos Apache Tribe, exercising its sovereignty in Arizona, managed its healthcare programs and billed outside insurers directly. However, the Tribe encountered difficulties in funding the additional healthcare services from third-party revenue without corresponding CSC from IHS. The Tribe sued the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, IHS, and the United States, for the CSC for the years 2011–2013. The district court dismissed the Tribe’s claim for the third-party-revenue-funded portions of the Tribe’s healthcare program from CSC reimbursement, and the Tribe appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the statutory text of 25 U.S.C. § 5325(a) warranted a reversal of the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings, highlighting ongoing challenges in achieving true parity and financial sustainability for tribal healthcare programs under the existing legislative framework. Question Must the Indian Health Service pay “contract support costs” not only to support IHS-funded activities, but also to support the tribe’s expenditure of income collected from third parties?

Harrow v. Department of Defense Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 25, 2024. Petitioner: Stuart R. Harrow.Respondent: Department of Defense. Advocates: Joshua P. Davis (for the Petitioner) Aimee W. Brown (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Stuart R. Harrow was a federal employee who was furloughed in 2013. He appealed the furlough decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), but due to short staffing, the MSPB did not rule on Harrow’s appeal for more than five years, during which Harrow changed his email address. On May 11, 2022, the MSPB affirmed the agency’s furlough action and attempted to inform Harrow that he had 60 days to seek judicial review. However, because he had changed email addresses, Harrow did not learn of the MSPB’s denial until after 60 days had elapsed. On September 8, 2022, Harrow moved the Board for an extension of time to appeal, but the Board denied the motion for lack of jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the denial, holding that the timely filing of a petition from the Board's final decision is a jurisdictional requirement and “not subject to equitable tolling.” Question Is the 60-day filing deadline in 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) jurisdictional and thus not subject to equitable tolling?

Texas v. New Mexico and Colorado Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 20, 2024. Petitioner: Texas.Respondent: New Mexico and Colorado. Advocates: Frederick Liu (for the United States) Lanora C. Pettit (for Texas) Jeffrey J. Wechsler (for New Mexico) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This is a continuation of an action involving a dispute over the waters of the Rio Grande Basin and Elephant Butte. The Supreme Court previously held that the United States may intervene in the action, which it did. When the Special Master filed the Third Interim Report, Colorado, Texas, and New Mexico moved for entry of a proposed "Consent Decree" that would resolve the dispute without the consent of the United States. The United States claims that the Court should deny the motion because (1) a court's approval of a consent decree cannot dispose of the valid claims of nonconsenting intervenors—i.e., the United States in this case; (2) the consent decree would impose obligations on a party, to wit, the United States, without that party's consent; and (3) the consent decree would be "contrary to the Compact." Question May a court enter a consent decree among Texas, New Mexico, and Colorado regarding the Rio Grande Compact without the consent of the United States, who intervened in the action?

Gonzalez v. Trevino Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 20, 2024. Petitioner: Sylvia Gonzalez.Respondent: Edward Trevino, II, et al. Advocates: Anya A. Bidwell (for the Petitioner) Nicole F. Reaves (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Sylvia Gonzalez, a resident of Castle Hills, Texas, was elected to the city council in 2019. During her campaign, she learned of widespread dissatisfaction with the current city manager. After taking office, she organized a nonbinding petition calling for the manager's removal. The petition was presented at a contentious council meeting, after which Mayor Edward Trevino questioned Gonzalez about the petition's location, found in her binder. Two days later, Trevino initiated a criminal complaint against Gonzalez for allegedly stealing the petition. Despite an atypical legal process involving Chief-of-Police John Siemens and special detective Alex Wright, Gonzalez was arrested and spent a night in jail. She is no longer on the council and has refrained from public political activity. Gonzalez sued Trevino, Siemens, Wright, and the city (collectively, the Defendants) for violating her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. She argued that the arrest was in retaliation for engaging in conduct protected by the First Amendment, but she conceded that there was probable cause for the arrest. In support of her retaliation claim, she cited a decade-long review of misdemeanor and felony data in Bexar County that showed no similar cases.   The Defendants moved to dismiss her lawsuit on grounds of the independent-intermediary doctrine and qualified immunity, but the district court allowed Gonzalez’s claims to proceed. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that the outcome was controlled by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Nieves v. Bartlett, holding that, in general, the existence of probable cause will defeat a retaliatory arrest claim. The Fifth Circuit noted that Gonzalez’s facts did not trigger the narrow exception recognized in Nieves, under which a plaintiff need not plead lack of probable cause “where officers have probable cause to make arrests, but typically exercise their discretion not to do so.” Question 1. Can the probable-cause exception in Nieves v. Barlett be satisfied by objective evidence other than specific examples of arrests that never happened? 2. Is Nieves limited to individual claims against arresting officers for split-second arrests?

Oral argument for Texas v. New Mexico and Colorado, argued on March 20, 2024. Once a transcript is available on oyez.org, the recording and this description will be replaced by more detailed information.

Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 19, 2024. Petitioner: Truck Insurance Exchange.Respondent: Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc., et al. Advocates: Allyson N. Ho (for the Petitioner) Anthony A. Yang (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) C. Kevin Marshall (for the debtor respondents) David C. Frederick (for the claimant respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, allows a Chapter 11 debtor with significant asbestos liabilities to channel all current and future asbestos claims into a trust funded by the debtor. This provision aims to treat future claimants equitably, given the long latency period of some asbestos-related illnesses, while also enabling the debtor to exit bankruptcy as a viable economic entity. To obtain relief under this section, the debtor must meet several criteria designed to protect the due process rights of claimants, especially future ones. These criteria include the appointment of a representative for future claimants and court determination that the plan is fair to both current and future claimants. Additionally, 75% of current claimants must vote to approve the plan. In the face of over 38,000 asbestos-related lawsuits since 1978, Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc., and Hanson Permanente Cement, Inc., collectively known as the "Debtors," filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2016. As part of their proposed reorganization Plan, the Debtors negotiated with multiple parties—including insurance companies, creditors, government agencies, and representatives of both current and future asbestos claimants—to establish a § 524(g) trust. This trust aimed to channel both existing and future asbestos-related claims away from the Debtors. The trust's financial viability heavily depended on primary liability insurance policies issued by Truck Insurance Exchange ("Truck") between the 1960s and 1980s, which obligated Truck to investigate and defend each asbestos claim against the Debtors up to a per-claim limit of $500,000. The Debtors would assign their rights under these Truck policies to the § 524(g) trust as part of the Plan's funding. Truck opposed the Plan, arguing it failed to provide anti-fraud measures for insured claims that would be litigated in the tort system, thereby potentially exposing Truck to fraudulent claims. Despite Truck's objections, the bankruptcy court recommended confirmation of the Plan, finding it to be "insurance neutral" and therefore not impacting Truck's rights or obligations under the existing policies. The district court upheld this decision, confirming the Plan and thereby nullifying Truck's objections. Importantly, 100% of the asbestos personal-injury claimants had approved the proposed Plan, making Truck the sole objector. The district court confirmed the Plan over Truck’s objections, finding Truck lacked standing to challenge the Plan because it was not a “party in interest” under § 1109(b). The U.S. Circuit Court for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Question Is an insurer with financial responsibility for a bankruptcy claim a “party in interest” that may object to a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?

Diaz v. United States Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 19, 2024. Petitioner: Delilah Guadalupe Diaz.Respondent: United States. Advocates: Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the Petitioner) Matthew Guarnieri (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) On August 17, 2020, Delilah Guadalupe Diaz was returning to California from Mexico. At the border, a “crunch-like sound” was heard when she rolled down the car window, leading the border agent to call for backup and check the car's door panels using a density measuring device. Inspectors found 27.98 kilos of methamphetamine hidden in these panels. Diaz claimed she was unaware of the drugs in the car, explaining that she had initially traveled to Mexico with her daughter, who returned early. Diaz stayed back to visit her boyfriend, and used his car to return home. She stated her boyfriend had told her he would retrieve the car from her in a few days. The government charged Diaz with importation of methamphetamine in violation of the Controlled Substances Act. One of the elements of that offense is that the defendant knew she was transporting drugs. 21 U.S.C. § 960(a)(1). To prove that element, the government called an expert to testify that “narcotic traffickers do not entrust large and valuable quantities of narcotics to unknowing couriers.” Diaz sought to exclude the expert evidence, arguing that it would violate Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) by providing “a direct comment on the ultimate issue—Ms. Diaz’s knowledge.” However, the district court allowed the evidence, the jury found Diaz guilty, and the district court sentenced her to seven years in prison. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Question Under Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b), may a governmental expert witness testify that couriers know they are carrying drugs and that drug-trafficking organizations do not entrust large quantities of drugs to unknowing transporters to prove that the defendant knew she was carrying illegal drugs?